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I. Introduction
Racine et al’s works about contemporary neuroscience in the media show how the neuro-essentialist approach to the mind-brain problem is rooted in occidental societies. Some clear connections could be 
established between this approach and the philosophical eliminativism of folk psychology. In this poster I examine some traits shared by both theoriess, more concretely those who may affect the interdisciplinary 
dynamism of Neuroscience. 
Public Neuro-Essentialism
According to Racine, Neuro-Essentialism 
(NE) designates interpretations that the 
brain is” the self-defining essence of a 
person, a secular equivalent to the soul… a 
combination of biological reductionism and 
enthusiasm for neuroscience research (1).
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Moreover NE seems to be a theory 
supported more by the media than by the 
scientific community. Probably because 
of that it is frequent to find there 
“debatable and uncorrected 
epistemological and ethical assumptions 
of neuroscience innovation” (2).
However, Is this Public Neuro-essentialism 
(PN) only a phenomenon caused by poor 
communication between science and the 
media? Is there no trace of such approach 
on Neuroscience? Besides, Are there other 
factors (ideological or economical) related to 
the gap between science and society? (See 
Diagram 1)
Media
Misunderstanding?
I define Neuro-Essentialism on Science 
(NonS) as a kind of sophisticated NE that is 
widespread in academic and experimental 
research forums. Their thesis about neuronal 
reductive materialism, very similar to the PN 
ones, are present frequently in 
neuroscientific papers. The references used 
to elaborate such neuro-anthropology are 
mainly linked to Eliminative Materialism’s 
philosophers (EM) (3). 
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NonS is free from PE’s enthusiasm for 
Neuroscience innovation but it suffers still 
from epistemological and ethical mistakes. 
Moreover, outside science it is supported only 
by a small group of non-experimental 
thinkers. 
Not other serious philosophical alternatives 
compete against NE in the fields of 
Neuroscience. It is a fact that such theoretical 
interpretation is not the most prominent and 
strongest in Philosophy of Mind. What are the 
reasons for its monopoly? Theoretical affinities, 
opportunity, scientific pride…? Are there other 
ideological and economical interests involved in 
it too? (See diagram 2)
Eliminative Materialism
The main thesis of NonS is that 
neuroscientists have a dominant position in all 
fields of knowledge. In this context, the 
function of Philosophy would mainly be getting 
to understand why neuroscientists (but no 
other researchers) don’t need to learn 
philosophy (4)
Science community (a lot more than 
philosophers) has a powerful influence on 
public opinion. The non-critical success of EM 
on science led to its widespread adoption on 
society . Does not it involve an illegitimate use 
of the authority of Science by philosophy? (See 
diagram 4)
Eliminative Materialism is a most 
sophisticated, moderate and well founded kind 
of NE. It is developed, understood, managed 
and criticized mainly in philosophy forums. 
Moreover, EM claims that dialogue with non 
experimental sciences is necessary, but by 
practical reasons. Because of science does 
not have yet all the true answers, we need to 
keep the mythological ones (for example, 
those that use folk psychology concepts) in 
order to avoid radical and unpredictable 
changes on human styles of life (6).
Other important problem is the complacence 
attitude that NonS promotes toward 
Neuroscience. Does not it damage the 
interdisciplinary dynamism of Neuroscience? 
Does not it induce prejudices and susceptibilities 
between the rest areas of knowledge? (See 
diagram 3)
However, in the long run and from a 
communicative and psychological point of 
view, is it possible to sustain efficiently and 
healthily this sort of Orwellian interdisciplinary 
attitudes? (See diagram 5)
Conclusions
Orwellian
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As Patricia Churchland writes: “Human 
cognition is thus commonsensically portrayed 
as a dance of sentential or propositional 
states, with the basic unit of computation 
being the inference from several such states 
to some further sentential state. These 
assumptions are central elements in our 
standard conception of human cognitive 
activity, a conception often called "folk 
psychology" to acknowledge it as the common 
property of folks generally. Their universality 
notwithstanding, these bedrock assumptions 
are probably mistaken” (5). 
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Diagram 1: Flow of information between 
Neuroscience and Society
Diagram 2: Flow of information between 
Philosophy and Neuroscience
Diagram 3: From interdisciplinar to hierarchical 
dinamysm of Neuroscience
Diagram 5: Non reductive EM dialogue 
with other fields and society.
Diagram 4: Spreading of EM on Society
Eliminative materialism, in the way that it is 
being assimilated by Neuroscience does not 
contribute to the necessary deep discussions 
and exchanges of ideas previous to any 
responsible and common use of powerful 
biotechnology resources. Besides, I don’t think 
that such strategies are favorable to the 
serious development of any kind of materialistic 
and non materialistic theories of Mind-Brain 
relation, or to Neuroscience itself.
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